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RESPONSE
A FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SOCIAL-
OBLIGATION NORM
Jedediah Purdy†
I applaud Gregory Alexander for proposing an innovative view of
property, one focused on the obligations of ownership.  His project
locates what I think of as the liberal aim of personal freedom (mean-
ing both formal autonomy and real opportunity) within a social con-
text of distributive choices and conceptions of mutual obligation.
That is, he is asking what counts as a free society, and he is putting
property regimes at the center of the answer.  I want to set out some
questions about where his project goes from here.
A couple of preliminary issues are worth raising at the start.  One
is a simple question about the scope of Professor Alexander’s social
obligation principle: is it national, global, or something else?  The le-
gal examples come—almost inevitably—from national property re-
gimes.  Professor Alexander’s justifying argument for the social-
obligation principle, though, seems to press in a strongly cosmopoli-
tan direction.  His argument for a requirement to value in others
those potential capabilities that one values in oneself, if it holds,
seems most likely to hold for all humanity: its logic is universal, not
national.  If that is the idea, it puts the project at a considerable dis-
tance from the national regimes that furnish the article’s important
examples, at least in respect of scope.
The second preliminary question is about the interaction be-
tween two roles property law might play in this project.  The first role
is as a distribuendum of a freestanding theory of distributive justice,
which should share around property rights as it does other parts of
what John Rawls called primary goods and what Amartya Sen might
regard as the preconditions of achieving an adequate set of human
capabilities.1  The second is as a source of insight about appropriate
principles of distributive justice.  I get more of the first feeling from
† Associate Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law; Visiting Professor, Yale
Law School, 2008–09.  For discussion relevant to this Response, I thank Gregory S. Alexan-
der, Nestor Davidson, Christopher Elmendorf, David Grewal, Thomas Merrill, Eduardo
Pen˜alver, Carol Rose, Henry Smith, Joseph William Singer, and Laura Underkuffler.
1 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 78–81 (rev. ed. 1999); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOP-
MENT AS FREEDOM 74–77 (1999).
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Professor Alexander’s argument that a strong social-obligation norm
should be binding on all upon pain of inconsistency, but more of the
second from his discussion of cases.  As my other questions will sug-
gest, I am friendly toward a hybrid of the two.
The other questions are more speculative, really invitations to
Professor Alexander or others to consider future projects.  Several
also intersect with my preliminary questions; answers to the later ques-
tions might illuminate the earlier ones.
The first such question concerns how far the idea of obligation
might reach in making sense of the full scope of property law as it now
exists.  I read the legal examples in Professor Alexander’s article as
involving telling exceptions to the conventional operation of property
rights, in which authoritative third-party actors (courts, sometimes in
conjunction with legislatures) abridge the exclusion power to en-
shrine an overriding social interest.  I wonder whether it might be
fruitful to see in the same light features of “normal property” involv-
ing no case-specific exception.  For one example, consider the bounds
of property: what it is that cannot be owned.  Limits on the domain of
ownership form a defining feature of property rights with definite im-
plications for the meaning of the ownership regime.2  The prohibition
on owning human beings is not a utility-maximizing rule, but an ex-
pression of a commitment to the in-principle equality of all persons.3
That commitment is not an exogenous constraint on property rights,
but a feature of our property regime: everyone has the legal capacity
to be an owner, and no one can be owned.  To participate in Ameri-
can property law is, therefore, to embrace an obligation to honor a
version of human equality, an obligation so basic to property law that
it easily becomes invisible.
2 I have discussed this issue as one internal to the development of the American
property regime in Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the Free-
dom-Promoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047 (2007).  For a view of the same issue
that is more concerned to define the limits of that regime’s appropriate operation, see
MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 16–101 (1996) (surveying reasons against
extending the domain of property).
3 As to the normative basis of the prohibition, I find it uncontroversial that a demon-
stration that slavery would increase utility, according to the relevant formula (total max-
imization, maximum average, a distribution-sensitive formula, or whatever else), would not
be taken as sufficient reason to reinstate it.  For a satirical treatment of this issue offering a
Swiftian proposal to reinstitute slavery as a development tool, see Press Release, World
Trade Org., WTO Announces Formalized Slavery Model for Africa (Nov. 13, 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.gatt.org/wharton.html.  As to the matter of the historical causation of
abolition, recent work tends strongly toward the view that abolition cannot be explained by
pursuit of material welfare (one standard proxy for utility) and instead represented a tri-
umph of a new conception of equal human freedom. See DAVID BRION DAVIS, INHUMAN
BONDAGE: THE RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD 231–49 (2006) (surveying
historiographic work done in recent decades).
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That obligation to honor interpersonal equality is more visible,
however, if one thinks of it as organizing other limits on ownership.
Consider certain traditional and contemporary limitations on the
power to exclude: the common carrier obligation to admit all comers
and requirements under civil rights law to give up racial and other
group biases upon committing residential housing to the market
rather than keeping it as a primary residence.4  These are not strict
limits on the exclusion power, of course, but they categorically restrict
the exclusion power of owners who use their real property on the mar-
ket.  It is uncontroversial that ownership is a building block of, and
sets in motion, market relations.  What may be less obvious is that
what one might call “market property” carries special limits on exclu-
sion, in favor of a universalist principle that all comers must have ac-
cess to market relations.
Now consider in this light a canonical exception to the exclusion
power, the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in State v. Shack that a
farmer could not prevent social workers or other guests from visiting
resident migrant laborers on his private land.5  It might be that the
most illuminating way to understand this case is as part of a broader
obligation, instinct in ownership, to honor human equality.  The
farmer’s violation of that obligation in Shack was his effort to use his
ownership right to impose a subordinate status on resident employ-
ees, denying them access to ordinary social interactions (with guests)
and information about their legal rights (that the social workers
sought to offer).6  It is at the heart of the obligation enshrined in the
common carrier and civil rights laws, and the deeper commitment to
equality in the bounds of ownership, that there is no caste in property
law.  The positive meaning of that idea might be thought of as an
open-market principle: all must be able to join in the characteristic
interactions of market life on terms equal in principle—that is, with-
out legal disability from owning, buying, selling, or engaging others.7
4 For discussions of common carrier duties, see 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTA-
RIES *164–66 (setting out the traditional common-law view); A.K. Sandoval-Strausz, Trav-
elers, Strangers, and Jim Crow: Law, Public Accommodations, and Civil Rights in America, 23 LAW
& HIST. REV. 53 (2005) (arguing that the doctrine had a relatively restricted scope in the
nineteenth century); Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1292–94, 1303–48 (1996) (arguing that the doc-
trine represented a strong limit on owners’ exclusion power in the earlier decades of the
nineteenth century).  For civil rights exclusions, see Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601–19 (2006).
5 277 A.2d 369, 374–75 (N.J. 1971).
6 See id.
7 For a discussion of the social vision behind this principle, see EMMA ROTHSCHILD,
ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS: ADAM SMITH, CONDORCET, AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT 7–15 (2001)
(describing the moral aims of Adam Smith’s reformist program).  I have developed this
argument with particular reference to property regimes in Purdy, supra note 2, at
1079–1100.
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The conception of equality I am describing concerns equal access
to market processes, not equality in the outcomes of those processes.
In this respect it is less ambitious in its conception of justice than Pro-
fessor Alexander’s account, which aims at a just distribution of the
resources necessary to realize human capabilities.8  It strikes me as
quite possible, though, that one might build on the conception I am
describing as instinct in our property regime, moving in the direction
of Professor Alexander’s position.  That development has plenty of
historical precedent, from the proregulatory Supreme Court Justices
of the Lochner era, who argued that only regulation could ensure real
equality in the “struggle for subsistence,”9 to Progressive Era Presi-
dents such as Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt, who insisted
that their regulatory and redistributive programs were the only way to
make the traditional American aims of security and opportunity real
in industrial society.10  I have argued for a version of it on the basis of
a view of property and markets that emerged in the early-modern
thought of figures such as Adam Smith, in which property rights and
markets were the instruments of a conception of society that put at its
center relations of reciprocity and persuasion, rather than hierarchy
and command.11
My second question concerns the mode of justification for the
social-obligation view.  I understand Professor Alexander’s argument
as a broadly Kantian one: it achieves its account of obligation by apply-
ing a strict standard of consistency to the individual’s activity of valua-
tion.12  Clearly, Professor Alexander is in strong philosophical
8 See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 745, 774 (2009) (“[A]n owner is morally obligated to provide to the soci-
ety of which the individual is a member those benefits that the society reasonably regards
as necessary for human flourishing.  These are the benefits necessary to the members’
development of those human qualities essential to their capacity to flourish as moral agents
and that have some reasonable relationship with ownership of the affected land.”).
9 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
10 See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1937), in INAUGURAL
ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: GEORGE WASHINGTON TO BARACK
OBAMA (2009), available at http://www.bartleby.com/124/ (“By using the new materials of
social justice we have undertaken to erect on the old foundations a more enduring struc-
ture for the better use of future generations.”); Woodrow Wilson, First Inaugural Address
(Mar. 4, 1913), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra
(“Our duty is to cleanse, to reconsider, to restore, to correct the evil without impairing the
good, to purify and humanize every process of our common life without weakening or
sentimentalizing it.”).
11 See Purdy, supra note 2, at 1079–1100. See generally Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Pro-
moting Approach to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237,
1242, 1297 (2005) (arguing in favor of a “freedom-promoting conception of property” that
“centers on the development of capabilities, with special emphasis on expanding people’s
set of viable choices and replacing relations of domination and subordination with reci-
procity” (emphasis omitted)).
12 For a discussion of the Kantian project of moral justification in contrast to that of
Hegel, see CHARLES TAYLOR, HEGEL 365–78 (1975).
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company here, and I don’t mean to second-guess the approach, but I
would like to point out another way of proceeding.  Professor Alexan-
der’s account of humanity—what Kant and some later thinkers would
have called philosophical anthropology—is quite deliberately in a dif-
ferent vein than that of Aristotle and Hegel.13  This is the source of his
learned and extremely illuminating discussion of interdependence
and the emergence of individual personality, even the superficially
hyperindividual quality of autonomy, from a web of relationships, in-
stitutions, and traditions.
That tradition has a problem with justification, however, if justifi-
cation means vindicating one’s position in a way that no one can ra-
tionally deny.  The Aristotelian/Hegelian tradition postulates that
people always reason within cultural contexts, and that what counts
for them as a reason is culturally conditioned.14  Some might see this
as a counsel of normative despair, a sure road to “relativism,” but for
figures such as Charles Taylor (whose work Professor Alexander
keenly grasps), there is no hint of despair in the idea.15  Rather, there
is recognition that, like autonomy, rationality and the aspiration to
normative universalism—meaning both honoring all equally and seek-
ing to persuade all—are culturally specific achievements, and ex-
traordinary ones.16  As I read Professor Taylor, he believes that this
implies a preferred approach to normative reasoning, an ethics of ar-
ticulacy that requires being as clear and complete as possible in our
accounts of the worldviews we share, what Taylor has recently called
the “social imaginaries” in which experience finds its shape and mean-
ing.17  Such reasoning makes possible a kind of persuasion in which
people come to recognize their own experience in the description be-
ing given, or are persuaded to adopt new aspirations as truer expres-
sions of their own experience and identity.  This is the way, for
13 See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS NEED
THE VIRTUES 71–74 (1999) (discussing the character of human interdependence); TAYLOR,
supra note 12, at 365–78; CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in POWERS, POSSESSIONS, AND FREEDOM
39, 55–57 (Alkis Kontos ed., 1979).
14 See sources cited supra note 11.
15 See CHARLES TAYLOR, Comparison, History, Truth, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 146,
164 (1995) (arguing that an understanding of multiple cultures is important “[n]ot only to
avoid political and military conflict where possible, but also to give people of every culture
some sense of the immense gamut of human potentialities”); TAYLOR, Explanation and Prac-
tical Reason, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS, supra, at 34, 58–59 [hereinafter TAYLOR, Expla-
nation and Practical Reason] (arguing that individuals who have an understanding of
multiple cultures “have a truer grasp of the human condition than those for whom alterna-
tive ways are utterly inconceivable”).
16 See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY
81–106 (1989) (giving a critical but respectful account of the ambition of universalism in
contemporary moral thought).
17 See id. at 53–107; see also CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 1–30 (2004)
(setting out the idea of a social imaginary in relation to the program of articulation).
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instance, that religious conversion has always occurred (when not by
the sword) and that, today, the blandishments of personal liberty and
prosperity make their appeal against traditional ways of life.18
I think this sort of reasoning exactly characterizes Professor Alex-
ander’s Commodity & Propriety, one of the best books ever written
about the social and political visions attached to American property
law.19  So, I wonder what it would have been like for Professor Alexan-
der in his article to set aside irresistible argumentation and instead
present the social-obligation vision of property as the best expression
of a tradition in which we—Americans, common lawyers, moderns—
make sense of our lives.  In raising the question, I do not mean to find
fault, but I do suspect the result of this approach would be compelling
in a different way than the argument Professor Alexander develops in
his article.  It might run along these lines: The idea that we have
rights, but not obligations, in our economic activity and the communi-
ties in which it takes place, is a pleasing illusion (to some).  It appeals
to ideas of self-mastery, self-authorship, and personal responsibility,
which all have deep roots in the American ethos.20  But it is not (to
borrow a phrase from Professor Taylor) the best account of what we
value in ourselves, others, or the institutions and practices we share.21
It is not the best account because, as Professor Alexander admirably
points out,22 it neglects the fact that autonomy arises from traditions
and communities, so imagining that it could be self-sustaining without
also sustaining those is self-undermining.  But it is also not the best
account because, in fact, our tradition shows a pervasive regard for
responsibility and contribution, particularly toward the ideal of a na-
tional community in which all can realize their potential.  This is the
vision of political membership and political economy that motivated
Abraham Lincoln and Frederick Douglass to seek equal citizenship for
all and an end to human property; Franklin Roosevelt to seek a redefi-
nition of property rights in the direction of universal security and op-
portunity; and contemporary reformers—Professor Alexander among
18 I give some concrete examples of how this might work in relation to women’s par-
ticipation in labor markets in Purdy, supra note 2, at 1101–07.
19 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROP-
ERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970 (1997).
20 For instances of this idea, see Abraham Lincoln, Address Before the Wisconsin
State Agricultural Society (Sept. 30, 1859), available at http://www.nal.usda.gov/speccoll/
exhibits/lincoln/lincoln_wisconsin.html (praising the principles of free labor as aligning
reward with desert in almost all cases); see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 155, 164 (1988) (quoting Northern Republicans
on the virtues of the system).
21 See TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 57–58 (setting out what he calls the “best account”
principle).
22 See Alexander, supra note 8, at 765 (“[A] proper concern for human autonomy
requires looking beyond mere functionings to include the capabilities that various social
matrices generate for their members.”).
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them—to argue that our political and legal culture has swung too far
in the direction of winner-take-all, loser-pays economic libertarian-
ism.23  As one reader, I find that American tradition a source of com-
pelling illumination about why I value what I value and what it means
to take this seriously.  This is akin to the demand for consistency in
reasoning, but it is a different kind of appeal, and one that strikes me
as consonant with much of Professor Alexander’s work, in this article
and elsewhere.
Third, I wonder what it would be like to treat law and economics
as part of a tradition that participates in the property-and-markets de-
bate about the meaning of interpersonal equality.  This might seem a
stretch, but consider the sources and commitments of the main law-
and-economics normative approaches to assessing institutions: wealth
maximization and Pareto optimality.  Wealth maximization is basically
a variant of utilitarianism, which has settled on a metric more tracta-
ble than the immeasurable quality of pleasure.  For uber-utilitarian
Jeremy Bentham and his followers, the moral gravamen of the pro-
gram was (in significant part) that it counted the well-being of all
alike; those reformers scorned obscurantist modes of reasoning that
they saw as preserving the inequitable privileges of elites.24  Utilitari-
anism, then, was in good part a view about equality, and as a mode of
justification, it relied on the idea that all who participated in social life
were obliged to respect that idea of equality—that is, to embrace a set
of institutions and rules designed on the principle that the welfare
(or, happiness) of each counted alike.
Although the next assertion will probably surprise (and fail to
persuade) some, I think the Pareto-efficiency criterion, with its restric-
tion of evaluation of states of affairs to pair-wise comparisons by indi-
viduals—that is, individual rankings of two alternatives as respectively
better and worse—also reflects commitment to an idea of human
equality.  The backdrop to this idea is mainstream economists’ rejec-
tion of interpersonal utility comparisons that limited “scientific” com-
parisons to the Pareto-criterion question: does any given individual
prefer state of affairs A to B, or the reverse?  Interpersonal utility com-
23 I give an interpretation of these aspects of American tradition in JEDEDIAH PURDY, A
TOLERABLE ANARCHY: REBELS, REACTIONARIES, AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN FREEDOM
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 25–32, 43–45, 184, on file with author).
24 Consider this presentation of Bentham’s thought and motives by commentator of
mixed sympathy:
In the eighteenth century the most active instinct was that of reaction
against theological tyranny and against social injustice.  Hence the fashiona-
ble moral theory was that which asserted, in the crudest form, the right of
man to enjoy himself in this life and the right of every man to an equal
chance of enjoyment.
F.C. Montague, Introduction to JEREMY BENTHAM, A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 1, 35 (F.C.
Montague ed., Oxford, Clarendon Press 1891) (1776).
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parisons, by contrast, would make it possible to ask whether one indi-
vidual is better off than another, and by such comparisons of utility
levels, ask which state of affairs maximizes overall utility in aggregate
or on average (or optimizes it according to some distribution-sensitive
criterion).  Historically, the rejection of interpersonal utility compari-
sons in Anglo-American economics owes centrally to Lionel Robbins.
Professor Robbins attacked interpersonal comparison as unscientific,
claiming that because utility is unobservable, there is no basis for as-
serting that one person is enjoying more of it than another.25  But
Robbins also charged the ambition to make interpersonal compari-
sons with failure to respect the distinctness of individual desire, judg-
ment, and choice.  He worried that summing utility obscured the all-
important fact that my judgments are my judgments, and as good as
anyone else’s, even if I choose things that the official metric does not
treat as welfare enhancing (such as shoes over health care or concert
tickets over a warm jacket in November).26  He also believed that utili-
tarian summing sloughed over cultural differences in what counted as
well-being and, somewhat more creepily, whose well-being counted.
Robbins observed that he had no scientific way of dissuading a Brah-
min from believing himself capable of ten times as much happiness as
an Untouchable.27
One might believe one or both of these conceptions of human
equality is insufficient, or perhaps even that a view of equality that
implied sole adherence to Paretianism would commit its own reductio
ad absurdum.28  I think it would be a terrifically interesting project,
though, to approach both branches of law-and-economics welfare
analysis, as well as the simpler but more tractable proxy of wealth max-
imization, as parts of a tradition that has its own versions of the obliga-
tions imposed by (its own conceptions of) human equality, versions
that are in contrast to Professor Alexander’s, but also in potential con-
versation with it.  The intertraditional conversation I am imagining
would require stripping away a fair amount of theoretical elaboration
and approaching law-and-economics welfare analysis by way of its so-
cial imaginary.  It would, however, chime with some constructive de-
velopments in economic thought, including Professor Sen’s emphasis
on the importance of both rough-and-ready interpersonal utility com-
25 See LIONEL ROBBINS, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE & SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE
1–21, 104–58 (2d rev. ed. 1952).
26 See id. at 140 (“There is no way of comparing the satisfactions of different people.”).
27 See id.; see also Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment, 48
ECON. J. 635, 637 (1938) (noting that this idea could render the entire “science” of eco-
nomics useless).
28 See AMARTYA SEN, The Possibility of Social Choice, in RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 65,
92–94 (2002) (explaining that the liberal paradox theorem “shows the impossibility of sat-
isfying even a very minimal demand for liberty when combined with an insistence on
Pareto efficiency (given unrestricted domain)”).
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parisons and libertarian procedural protections, and even of democ-
racy, in any compelling picture of welfare.29
Fourth, I am interested in knowing more about the relationship
between social obligation and personal freedom in Professor Alexan-
der’s thinking.  I find it very attractive that he puts a high value on the
capacity for autonomy and enjoyment of meaningful opportunity30
(both of which I think belong in a conception of freedom), and that
he presents social obligation as entailing the promotion of these quali-
ties in others’ lives.  I wonder whether Professor Alexander would go
further and say not just that individuals can become more free when
others act on a social obligation to promote their freedom, but that
sometimes the very act of honoring social obligations makes us—all
who adopt the obligation—more free.  I think this is how many Ameri-
cans understand antidiscrimination law, including its housing-law
dimensions: its constraints make us freer not only inasmuch as we are
its potential victims, nor just inasmuch as it assists the right-minded in
performing nondiscriminatory acts that they would have wished any-
way, but also by virtue of committing us to a social practice of equality
and reciprocal respect, that is, making us a free society.  Now, this is a
positive conception of freedom in the strong, Isaiah Berlin–esque
sense of identifying freedom with achievement of a certain kind of
life, and much suspicion attaches to that kind of conception.31  The
idea that a free society has value over and above its (real and hugely
important) usefulness to many of that society’s members in their ex-
tant aims is also an instance of what Professor Taylor calls irreducibly
social goods, those that can be enjoyed only via membership in and
identification with a collective.32  This idea, too, is controversial, im-
plying as it does a departure (though it can be a modest one) from
methodological individualism.  Despite both points of controversy,
and to repeat, this seems to me to be how many of today’s Americans
understand some of our basic legal obligations.  I wonder whether
Professor Alexander would be inclined to embrace this image of the
relationship between obligation and freedom.
I am glad to have the chance to comment on such thought-pro-
voking work by a scholar from whom I have learned a great deal.  I
29 Id. at 77–92.
30 See Alexander, supra note 8, at 815 (“[A]utonomy interests will limit the social-obli-
gation norm if no equivalently weighty countervailing interests are present.”).
31 See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118, 131 (1969)
(“I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing
responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and
purposes.  I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true . . . .”).
32 See CHARLES TAYLOR, Irreducibly Social Goods, in PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS, supra
note 15, at 127.
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look forward to watching this project develop and, I hope, to continu-
ing conversation about it.
